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WARNING TIME REQUIRED BY THE APOLLO SPACECRAFT
TO SUCCESSFULLY ABORT IN THE EVENT OF A LAUNCH
VEHICLE FXPLOSION
C
By Charles Telxeira
f
, SUMMARY
Explosion of a Saturn Launch Vehicle stage will result in pres-
sures which exceed the Apollo Command Module's pressure limits if c
sufficient separation does not exist between the command module and the
2 explosion. The objective of the study was to determine the separation
_: (in terms of time from abort initiation to the time of explosion) re-
_ quired in order that the command module pressure limits are not exceed-
ed. This time is referred to as the required warning time. The study
'_ considered the individual explosion of the three Saturn V stages and
,;,, the two Saturn IB stages from the pad to an altitude of 60 000 feet.
_ The required warning times are the longest on the pad and in the
25 000 to 30 000 foot regime. The maximum warning time required for
_ the S-IB, S-IVB (Saturn IB), S-IC, S-II and S-IVB (Saturn V) are 2.68,
_i 3.31, 3.30, 5.88, and 3.50 seconds, respectively.
Sensitivity of the required warning times to changes in such pa-
rameters as launch escape motor thrust, command module pressure limit,
and the TNT equivalent yield, were also considered.
4_
_ INTRODUCTION
The "safe" separation is defined as the separation required by the
Apollo Command Module (CM) from the exploding launch vehicle (LV) in
order that the total external pressures do not exceed the CM's pressure
limits. These pressures include the overpressure produced by the as-
_ sumed explosion of the LV's propellants (specifically of a single
stage) and the aerodynamic pressures associated with the abort. The
_:,,. safe separation, given more conveniently in terms of time, plus the
"_ 0.20-seconds Launch Escape System (LES) reaction time, establishes the
/ required warning times as illustrated on page 2.
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3The required warning times were determined on the basis of pres-
sure hazards only. Fireball hazards were not considered during the
early phase of the abort studied (first i0 seconds) due to the short
exposure time anticipated and the temperature capability of the CM.
The fragmentation hazards are considered to be highly problematical.
However, the overpressure hazard is real and definable and consequently
was used as the explosive hazard criteria for the purposes of this
study.
Knowledge of the required warning times is necessary in order to:
! i. Aid in the _tablishment of the Emergency Detection System
i' (EDS) abort limits.
2. Enable evaluation of the overall abort system including the
EDS and the Launch Escape System (LES).
•_ 3. Define critical abort regimes in terms of the warning time
available and the warning time required in order that the criticalities
_ of LV failure modes may be viewed in their proper perspective.
• :_ SYMBOLS
.. Cp pressure coefficient
CT escape motor thrust coefficient
M# Mach number
PA aerodynamic pressure, psi = " Pc _
_. PC cavity pressure from ambient, psi
sum of aerodynamic pressure (PA_ and static equivalent ofPTOT
press_r_ associated with shock front (2 AP), psi
_TOT average of above, psi
" Poo ambient pressure, psi
., AP peak pressure associated with the shock front (above
ambient), psi
/ '
1970024995-008
q dynamic pressure, psi
qo CMpltch rate at separation, deg/sec
R separationbetween command module an_ center of detonation
at time of shock front passage, ft
T required warning time, sec m
td time of detonation in seconds after conm_ndmodule -
launch vehicle separation
t time shock wave reaches command module in seconds after
sa
command module - launch vehicle separation
tss time to achieve safe separation, seconds after spacecraft/
launch vehicle separation
command module angle of attack during abort, deg
initial command module angle of attack at separation, deg
O
¢ circumferentialposition on command module, deg
- ! • .o GROUNDRULES " -
Abort TraJectories
J
i CM abort trajectories were obtained through use of a G. E. Mass
i computer program. The attitude at the time of abort was assumed to be
(_o) "5°/seca pltch-up condition of -150 angle of attack and pitch?
rate qo for each of the altitude cases. The pltch-up abort condition
was assumed (with exception of pad abort) as a result of a previous
study (ref. 9) which indicated that a pltch-up abort condltlon generally
requires slightly longer warning times than for a nominal or pitch-down
abort condition. An abort at _o = O° /sec' qo = 0'° was assumed for
the pad case as it is a more reasonable assumption.
/_: The configuration assumed consists of a launch escape vehicle
• (LEV) (LEV = LES + CM) with an ii O00-pound CM and utilizing a pitch
control motor. Nominal escape motor thrust (i 155 000 ib) an_ thrust
mm mm .' _ _ _ If' r _ I __. _ ---- _r-- Jl_-- I
• m
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alinement (1.80°) were assumed in all cases with the exception of the
data presented in the appendix for various LES thrust levels•
In computing the CM-LV stage separatlon-timehistories the assump-
tion was made that the LV maintained a constant velocity and flight
path angle after CM-LV separation. This assumption was made in order
to obtain general results which are independentof LV failure modes and
the resulting off-nomlnalLV traJectcries. The assumption is reasonable
for the several seconds after abort under consideration.
The CM-LV separatlon-timehistories are generally relative to the;
CM-LV separation plane. As a result, the separatlon-tlmehistories
i were modified by aSlowing for the inherent separationbetween the CM-LV
separationplane and the assumed center of explosion for each stage.
/_ The separationsused are given below: .
_ Stage Initial Separation, ft
_ S-I i_0
.. ...._ S-nrB 57
._ s-zc 23O
:'_. 8.-II IUO
, W
...... _I 4" _'- SEPARATION PLANE
: _,i "---INITIAL SEPARATION
------CENTER OF DETONATION
1970024995-010
6CM Pressure Limits
The load limits assumed for this study were predicated on the
followin_ objectives:
i. Maintain capability to deploy recovery gear.
2. Maintai- pressure integrity of the crew compartment, l_.
The capability tc deploy the recove_r gear requires that the for-
ward heat shield be successfully jettisoned. In order to insure that
th_ forward heat shield can be Jettisoned, the assumption was made
that no deformation would be allowed in the external heat shield,
particularly in the region of the forward heat shield separation plane.
The crew compartment heat shield (which terminates at the separation
plane) has the lowest pressure capability (table I) accordin& to avail-
able data and conseque fly the correspondingpressure limits were used
as the limiting criteria. By insuring that the integrity of the ex-
ternal heat shield be maintained, the second objective, namely, integ-
rity of the internal crew compartment,will in general be satisfied.
Figure i illustrates the CM-LES combination and the required de-
plo_nent of the forward heat shield. The boost protective cover which
will be put over the CM (as defined at the time of the study) will not
improve the load=carrying ability of the CM's heat shield significantly.
_ The integrity of the aft heat shield, which is also of imrortanc_ _
because of its energy absorption function at landing, did not pose any R!
. "" problems since the load limits of the aft heat shield are considerably
higher than the cr_w compartment heat shield limits.
The influence of the CM pressure limit on the required warning
t_mes is shown in the appendix.
t
Aerodynamic Loads
The aerodynamic pressure loads on the CM during an abort are
functions of the Mach number (M#), dynamic pressure (q), angle of
attack (s), and escape motor thrust level (CT). These loads generally
reach a maxh_um at around 3.5 seconds after abort and vary considerably
from station to station. Since the area around the forward heat shield
1970024995-011
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separatio,, ._lane was considered to be critical, the loads _ere computed
,for this regiGn using the pressure coefficients given in references 1
through 3.
During an abort the CM will normally oscillate in angle of attack.
For the abort cases studied, the maximu_ angle of attack ( a ax_
generally reached but did not exceed 20° for aborts from the pad to
i0 000 feet. Above 15 000 feet the maximum angle of attack reached but
: did not exceed 25 °. Since the aerodynamic pressures at a given station
:- generally increase with an increasing angle of attack, the CM was as-
sumed to be at the maximum an_le asso.c_iatedwitl_ th_ partictO..arabort
)'the shock front passed over the CM. Consequently, *_ at the time tsa
_ the aerodynamic loads were computed for a = 20° from the pad to
i_, i0 000 feet and a = 25° above 15 000 feet.
The pressure limits given in table I are for differential pres-
,_ sures ecross the external heat shield. Consequently, the pressure in
the cavity between the external heat shield and the crew compartment
r. must be considered. The pressure in the cavity is maintained at ambi-
_" ent +-ipsi. In each case studied shock-front passage occurred when
_ the pressure in the cavity was below ambient due to the passive venting
which occurs. This b._!ow ambient cavity pressure acts essentially as
- _ a static external (positive_ pressure and is consequently added to the
aerodynamic pressures. The cavity pressures were obtained from
_ reference l_.
_. 0ver_ressure Loads
_" The methods of H. L. Brode (ref. 5) w_re used to calculate the
%
_ overpressures and the shock -#ave velocities. The following assumptions
.._ were made:
:_ 1. Individual detonation of each stage of the Saturn IB (S-IB,
S-IVB) and the Saturn V (S-IC, S-II, S-IVB) launch vehicles.
2. Single propellant source at the stages approximate geometric
center.
3. 10 percent TNT equivalent yield - LOX/RP-1 (S-IB, S-IC).
60 percent TNT equivalent yield - LOX/H2 (S-II, S-IVB).
. h Reflection factor = 2.0 for the pad case.
F:
_ In the altitude regime con._.=.rcd, the S-IC and the S-IB are
{. believed to be the most likely J _aatfunction since the_ are the
-' _
_k
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8thrusting stages and are subject to propulsion system failures. How-
ever, all LV stages were considered in order to illustrate the relative
explosive hazard of each.
The equivalent TNT yields of i0 percent and 60 percent are the
commonly used equivalencies for LOX/RP-I and LOX/H2, respectively.
These yields are generally believed to be conzervative (high), however,
the degree of conservatism could not be adequately established. The
influence of the TNT yields on the warning times is shown in the ap-
pendix.
The reflection factor of 2.0 is used for the pad case to account
for the explosive energy being expended in a hemispherical shock wave
' rather than in a spherical shock as assumed in reference 5. Actually
the shock will be spherical during the early stages of the expansion.
•_ The portion of the shock wave (lower hemisphere) that is reflected from
the earth's surface will catch up to the upper half of the shock wave
rather quickly due to the higher speed of the reflected shock. This
higher speed is due to the higher air temperature caused by the ori6i-
nal expansion and to a larger extent by the very high temperature that
will exist due to the fireball that will occur. Merging of the re-
flected shock and the shock cQnsisting of the upper half of the initial
sphere will result in one reinforced shock wave. The reflection factor
of 2.0 which accounts for the merging of the two shocks has the effect
of doubling the yield an0 was used for the pad case only.
The propellant quantity available for each altitude case was
determined by considering the propellant depletion that would occur
during a nominal boost trajectory.
" The CM pressure limits given previously (table I) are static pres-
sure limits. The shock wave induces a dynamic load on the CM and
consequently the overpressure load must be equated to an equivalent
static load. Studies by North American Aviation and MSC have indicated
; a load factor of 2.0 is applicable, that is, the pressure associated
with the shock wave is twice as severe as the pressure associated with
a static load. Consequently a given overpressure is doubled to obtain
an equivalent static pressure.
P_C_URE
A total of five explosion cases were studied: explosion of the
,_ .S-IB S-IVB (Saturn IB), S-IC, S-ll and the S-!VB (Saturn V). Each
_ case was studied from the pad to 60 000 feet at 5000 feet increments.
In each case, detonation times (td) were assumed and the resulting
] g70024gg5-o] 3
94"
i
total pressure loads acting on the CM at the time the shock front
passed over the CM were calculated and compared to the CM's pressure
l_mits. In order to compute the pressure loads two unknowns had to
be determined:
I. Shock arrival time - the time __(tsa) at which the shock front
reaches the CM had to be determined for each assumed detonation time.
This established the flight parameters (q, M# and CT) which were needed
_ to calculate the aerodynamic pressure distribution acting on the CM at
• the instant of shock front passage.
_ 2. CM - center of detonation (CD) separation - the distance (R)
between the CM and CD at the time of shock arrival had to be estab-
_ lished for each detonation time in order to compute the overpressure
_ acting on the CM.
The shock arrival time and the corresponding CM - CD separations,
"_ over-pressure, et cetera, were determined for each assumed detonation
time with the aid of a computer subroutine which was run in conjunction
._ with the abort trajectory program. The computations were made using a
'_ reiteration scheme and the stored abort trajectory data. The reitera-
•" ._ tion scheme is discussed in more detail in reference 6.
Tables II through VI summarize the shock arrival time q,tsa,
__ M#, CT, R, and the AP experienced by the CM for each assumed
detonation time and LV stage. Around 25 000 to 30 000 feet the abort-
$ ing CM begins to attain sufficient velocity during the abort to remain
ahead of the shock front for sufficient time t_ allow the overpressureto drop to very low values (tenths of a psi). As the abort altitude
: _ increases, the CM eventually is able to outrun the shock front during
•"" _ the entire time span under consideration (_10 seconds). The only
• I pressure loads acting on the CM during this time period are the aero-i_ dynamic pressure loads which are within the CM_s pressure limits.
The aerodynamic pressure distribution present at the time of shock
arrival was calulated using the flight conditions listed in tables II
through VI, the pressure coefficients from references 1 through 3, and
the cavity pressure data from reference 4.# The resulting aerodynamic
pressures CPA) were then totaled with the static equivalent of the
•Aerodynamic pressure distributions were not calculated for the
cases where the CM was able to outrun the shock front or when the over-
I pressures had dropped to such a low level that it was obvious the CM's
pressure limits were not exce,_ded.
., - •
L •
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overpressure (2 _P) for each assumed detonation time %1/td_in tables VII4
thro1_h XI. In all cases, the total pressures (PToT) were relatively
evenly distributed and were averaged (PToT) around the entire
CM ($ = 0 - 360°). The loads that were computed and given in the
tables were for $ = 0 - 180° since the loads are symmetrical about the
pitch plane.
The average total pressure load was plotted as a function of
detonation time in figures 3 through 7. The detonation times which
resulted in total pressures which did not exceed the symmetrical limit
of 6.1 psi were then determined acceptable (safe) detonation times.
The loads at thesetimes were then rechecked to insure that the un-
•i symmetrical pressure limits were not exceeded. In each case if the
average pressures d_d not excemd the symmetrical limit, the unsymmetri-
cal limit was also not exceeded.
The safe separation times are summarized in table XVII and are
added to the 0.20 seconds LES reaction time to obtain the required
: warning time. The resulting required warning times are plotted as
functions of the abort altitude in figures 8 and 9.
RESULTS AND DISCUSSION
i The warning times required by the Apollo CM are given in figures 8
and 9. The curves show relatively large time requirements on the paddue primarily to the assumed reflection factor and the large quantity
of propellant available at this time. However, the longest warning
_ time requirements for the non-thrusting stages are generally in the
20 000- to 30 O00-foot regime where the CM - LV separation-time histo-
, ries are the poorest due to the high drag environment. The thrusting
.: ._ stages (S-IB, S-IC) require the longest times on the pad since pro-
pellant depletion results in warning time requirements in the 20 000- to
30 O00-foot regime which are not qu_te as high as those on the pad.
: As the abort altitude increases and the CM speed during the abort
: exceeds sonic speeds, the CM is able to remain ahead of the expanding
shock for progressively longer periods of time. Consequently, when
shock arrival does occur the overpres_ires are quite low. As a result,
/_ the warning time requirements drop off appreciably after passage
through the 30 000-foot regime.
J_ Extrapolation of the data presented in figures 8 9,nd9 should be
"_', avoided due to the highly non-linear nature of the data involved. In
_!_:, _articular, the curves for the thrusting stages (S-IB, S-IC) appear to
- u-_- -- m aw_wr, mm _ m,,,,,qj_ 4 mlm "_mmm
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level off in the 50 000- to 60 O00-foot regime and extrapolation to
higher altitudes may appear reasonable. However, check cases have
shown the warning times decrease mazkedly above 60 0OO feet. In the
limiting case, the available propellant (thrusting stages) approaches
zero at staging and consequently the warning time required would also
approach zero. The S-IB curve given in figure 8, for example, does
not suggest such a decrease.
The large warning time requirements for the S-If stage (fig. 9)
4. are due to the large propellant loading and the 60-_ercent equivalency.
°["
Explosion of a given stag_ can conceivably inititate explosion of
an adjoining stage. Consequently, the aborting CMmay have to contend
with more than one explosion. Obviously, if the secondary explosion(s)
_' occurred after the primary explosion, sufficient separation may exist
9, between the CM and LV. The time that may in reality elapse between ex-
•_ plosion of adjoining stages is extremely difficult to estimate at this
,_ time. It is possible, however, to estimate the minimum time that
_ should elapse between the primary and the secondary explosions in ord,r
_ that the CMpressure limits will not be exceeded due to the secondaryf"
explosion. For example, if the S-IB explodes (i0 0OO ft, fig. 8)
_ 2.25 seconds after abort initiation, the CMpressure limits will not
be exceeded as a result of the S-I explosion since only 2.00 seconds
_ are required for safe separation. However, if the S-IVB (non-thrusting
stage) explodes (at the same altitude) before 2.60 seconds after abort
_ initiation, the CM pressure limits will be exceeded due to the S-IVB
_ overp_essures. This corresponds to .35 seconds between explosions
(2.60 - 2.25). Thus, if the time between explosions is less than
_i .35 seconds, CM limits will be exceededpressure by the secondary ex-
,_:: ploslon. This procedure can be carried on throughout the altitude re-
=_ gime in question and for various explosion times, abort times, et cet-
_ era.
,:,; CONCLUSIONS
Explosion of a Saturn LV stage can result in pressures which ex-
ceed the CM's pressure limits. Deformation of the CM's external struc-
ture can impair or even prevent deployment of the forward heat shield
and subsequent deployment of tae recovery gear. The time that must
elapse betweenabort initiation and the time of explosion (warning
_i_ time) in order that CM pressure limits will not be exceeded has been
;_. determined for the Saturn 133and V stages from the pad to an altitude
_ of 60 000 feet. The maximum warning times required during the launch
_ phase considered are 2.68, 3.31, 3.30, 5.88, and 3.50 seconds for ex-
plosion of the S-IB, S-IVB (Saturn IB): S-IC, S-If, and the S-IVB
i_i (Saturn V) stages, respectively. -'
J
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The effects of increased CM pressure capability, LES thrust and
of various TNT yields on the warning times _,erealso studied. In-
creased pressure capability of the CM by factors of almost 2 and B did
not show a large decrease in the required warning times. Increasing
the _j _hrust did net improve the situation at the lower altitudes but
did d_crea_e the required warning times appreciably in the 20 000- to
3£ 000-foot regime. Reductions by a factor of 2 in the TNT yields did
not show major _eductions in the required warning times below
30 000 feet. However, considerable reductions in the required warning
times can occur above B0 000 feet.
.. r
o,
H
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TABLE I.- MAXIMUM ALLOWABLE LIMIT DIFFERENTIAL PRESSURES
i
+/
Forward heat Crew compartment Aft heat
: shield heat shield shield
(stations 81-133) (stations 23-81) '(stations 0-23)
/ S_mnetrical pressure limit, psi
C_sh(+) +6.1 +61i +12.0
Burst (-) -i0.0 -4.5 -5.7 r
Unsy_aetrlcal pressure limit, psi
Crush (+) +12.1 +ii.i +16.6
Burst (-) -4.7 -5.8 -5.7
PA = Aerodynamic pressure (psi)
= PExternal - Pcavity
PExternal = P + Cpq:f. CO
"': Pcavity ®.5_ = P - P
_X. PA = Cpq -(+Pc)
, j
,, _
• 7: _3
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APP_--_DIX
The required warning times are dependent to varying degrees on the
following factors :
,._ i. CM pressure limit
!" 2. LES thrust (total impulse)
_ 3. TNT explosive yield
i In the main body of the study current values for the CM pressure limit
i_ (6.1 psi) and LES thrust (155 000 ib) were used as were the frequently
used TNT yields of i0 percent and 60 percent for LOX/RP-I and LOX/H2,
_i respectively. Values for these three parameters were varied in orderto illustrate their in luenc on th requir d warning times. _e case
of an S-IC stage explosion was considered. The resulting warning times
are given in figures A-I, A-2, and A-3, together with the warning time
_, curves for the nominal conditions considered previously. The increased
LES thrust cases required that approximations be made since wind tunnel
data was not available at these higher thrust levels. As a result, the
•_ pressure distributions obtained from the nominal thrust cases were
modified to account for the higher dynamic pressures associated with
. the increased thrust cases. In addition, the LES thrust cases did not
consider the corresponding LEV weight increase that would necessarily
have to occur. However, the results, though not exact, do illustrate
_i the relative influence of the thrust on the required warning times.
:/ ;'_ It is apparent from figures A-I, A-2 and A-3 that drastic im-
*:,_ prowment_ in CM and LES capabilities would in most cases not reducethe r quired warning times significantly. Increa ing the CM's pressure
limits from 6.1 to 15 psi reduces the required warning time by only
.55 seconds (25 000 ft). This is a rather modest return for what would
require a major CM modification. Above S0 000 feet the CM pressure
limit has a diminishing effect on the required warning times due to the
CM's ability to outrun the shock front.
Increasing the LES thrust by 25 percent and 50 percent results in
.. an appreciable reduction in the required warning times in the 20 O00-
to B0 O00-foot regime. However, on the pad, the warning times are
not reduced significantly.
Reduction of the TNT equivalent yield shows a marked decrease
(figure A-S) in the required warning times after approximately
25 000 feet (5 percent and S percent cases). An even more drastic
,*L
r.,
1970024995-069
6_
decrease occurs for the i percent case. Hcwever_ the pad and lower
altitude regime in general still require considerable warning times.
The above results indicate the rather insensitive nature of the .
required warning times. Increasing the CM pressure limit and the LES
thrust would require major redesign to si_nlfieantly reduce the re-
quired warning times. Above 30 000 feet, lower TNT yields could reduce
the required warning times significantly, particularly if the yields
are in the order of 3 to 5 percent (LOX/RP-I).
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